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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Judicial review of arbitral awards is afforded a great deal of importance and scrutiny in
international commercial arbitration proceedings. It is much debated as to whether judicial
review of arbitral awards is appropriate, given that international arbitration is considered to be a
mechanism that secures the final and binding determination of disputes.1 On one hand, scholars
opine that judicial review undermines the finality of arbitral awards and interferes with the
integrity of the arbitral process2, while others believe that, “much as the efficacy of international
commercial arbitration demands finality of awards, it is incumbent on national legal systems to
ensure the integrity of the arbitral process”.3
The opponents of judicial review also endorse the strong argument that relying on
national courts to correct possible errors in arbitration defeats the advantages of selecting
“neutral and potentially expert tribunals” and avoiding the possible “congestion, corruption and
See JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003) at 1-5 for definitions of international arbitration : “A
specially defined mechanism for the final and binding determination of disputes, concerning a contractual or other
relationship with an international element, by independent arbitrators, in accordance with procedures, structures and
substantive legal or non-legal standards chosen directly or indirectly by the parties”, id quoting Halsbury’s Laws of
England: “The process by which a dispute or difference between two or more parties as to their mutual legal rights
and liabilities is referred to and determined judicially and with binding effect by the application of law by one or
more persons(the arbitral tribunal) instead of by a court of law”, id at 3 quoting Domke: “Commercial Arbitration”
“[A] process by which parties voluntarily refer their disputes to an impartial third person, an arbitrator, selected by
them for a decision based on the evidence and arguments to be presented before the arbitral tribunal. The parties
agree in advance that the arbitrator’s determination, the award, will be accepted as final and binding upon them.”
2
For e.g., Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 147 (1997); Kenneth Curtin, An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 337, 339 (2000).
3
Chukwuemeke Okeke, Judicial Review of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Bane, Boon or Boondoggle? 10 N.Y. INT'L
L. REV. 29 (1997); see for e.g., William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
1

2
procedural pitfalls of national courts”.4 Given the contrasting opinions and potential problems
surrounding judicial review, it is advocated that if parties need to seek review of arbitral awards,
appellate arbitral review may be a suitable alternative to judicial review.
The concept of appellate arbitral review is not entirely new, given that a few existing
arbitration rules offer “built-in avenues of review”.5 However, a unified system of arbitral appeal
that offers predictability and universality is yet to be established. Eminent scholars and legal
experts have continuously been expressing a desire for the creation of a single transnational
institution for the enforcement and review of arbitral awards.6
The central focus of this thesis is how the establishment of a transnational appellate
arbitral review body (hereinafter AARB, the AARB) will serve as a suitable replacement for
judicial review and be a viable source of appeal in general. The thesis also encompasses an
elaborate set of suggestions based on which the AARB may be structured.
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 647 (1989); infra Chapter III for a more elaborate discussion
of this argument.
4
William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting The Farm On International Arbitration: Is It Time To Offer An
Appeal Option? 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 531 (2000).
5
Id at 534.
6
Howard M. Holtzmann , A Task for the 21st Century: Creating a New International Court for Resolving Disputes
on the Enforceability of Arbitral Awards in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE (Martin Hunter, Arthur Marriott & V.V.Veeder eds.,
1995) at 109: “A valuable task for the 21st century would be to create a new international court that would take the
place of municipal courts in resolving disputes concerning the enforceability of international commercial arbitration
awards”; Stephen M. Schwebel, The Creation and Operation of an International Court of Arbitral Awards in THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION at 115-116: “Accordingly, as things now
stand, there is no international court with an effective capacity or jurisdiction whose processes can be directly
activated by a private party which seeks the recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The need is
there, and no existing international court can meet it. So the case for creating such a new International Court of
Arbitral Awards is,...sound”; see also F.S. Nariman,, Martin Hunter and Bola A. Ajibola and Hans Van Houtte
endorsing the propositions of Holtzmann and Schwebel at 155-163 in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION; see also MAURO-RUBINO SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRTAION LAW AND PRACTICE, 2 (2001) at 35.9: “The solution which has been proposed by this writer is
to institutionalize the appellate instance by entrusting the appointment and supervision of appellate proceedings to a
new body, an International Arbitral Court of Appeal”; Knull & Rubins, supra note 4; Conrad K. Harper, Has the
Time Come for a Truly Neutral Forum? Reconsidering a Court of International Arbitration in HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND ADR (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Jeanette A. Jaeggi, eds., 2006) Hans
Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution, 25 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 29 (1986).

3
Chapter 2 of this thesis will examine how different national laws view the concept of
judicial review of international arbitral awards. Chapter 3 will address the various arguments
against judicial review and how the AARB will be a suitable replacement for the same. Chapter
4 will talk about the available appeal options within the realm of arbitration and the need for a
unified system through which appellate review of awards may be conducted. Chapter 5 will list
various recommendations for the AARB and Chapter 6 will draw a conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS - A TRANSNATIONAL SURVEY

“The whole point of arbitration is that the merits of the dispute will not be
reviewed in courts, wherever they be located”.7

Judicial review of an international arbitral award is conducted by the national courts at
the place of arbitration or enforcement.8 The most important interaction of the arbitral procedure
with the judicial procedure is the judicial review of awards.9 Judicial review of arbitral awards
can happen in two different ways. Either the losing party seeks to attack the award or the
winning party seeks to confirm the award.10 Generally, if an award is successfully annulled,
recognition of that award will be refused in any other country on the basis of that annulment.11
On the other hand, the effects of confirmation or refusal of confirmation of an award are limited
to the jurisdiction where such confirmation is sought.12
The standard of judicial review for setting aside or annulling an award varies with each
country. While some countries allow for judicial review on the entire merits of the case13, most
countries limit the grounds of judicial review, most of which correspond to the exceptions to
Justice Conboy’s comment in International Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, 745
F.Supp. 172 S.D.N.Y.,1990.
8
See CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE, LARS KIRCHHOFF & GABRIEL SCHERER, ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, 2 (2006) at 54,55.
9
Id at 52.
10
Wang Shengchang & Cao Lijun, National Courts and Lex Fori in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006) at 177
11
BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 54.
12
Id.
13
Id at 55.
7
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recognition and enforcement contained in the New York Convention.14 Since the trends in
judicial review of international arbitral awards can best be observed from the practices of the
United States and the major European arbitration countries,15 we will examine the laws of those
countries hereunder.

A. Judicial Review under Different National Laws

The Federal Arbitration Act of the United States16 was amended in 1970 to implement the
New York Convention.17 The Act provides for arbitration awards to be enforced pursuant to the
New York Convention and stipulates that confirmation proceedings may be initiated where the
prevailing party seeks to enforce the award in the United States, but not when the party seeks to
enforce the award abroad.18 The Act provides limited grounds for challenging an award, as per
the Article V of the Convention and United States courts interpret Article V defenses narrowly.19
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 544; Article V of the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (hereinafter the New York
Convention) states that :
(1) Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused [if]: a) The parties to the [arbitration] agreement …
were … under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid …; or b) The party against whom the award is
invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was
otherwise unable to present his case; or c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by [the arbitration
agreement]; or d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or e) The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. (2) Recognition
and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if …: a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable
of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to the public policy of that country.
15
Okeke, supra note 3 at 43.
16
9 U.S.C. §§ 201, available at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode09/usc_sup_01_9_10_2.html.
17
Okeke, supra note 3 at FN 158: The United States ratified the New York Convention under two reservations. The
Convention only applies to matters considered commercial under United States law and on the basis of reciprocity.
The nationality of the parties is subordinate to the arbitral situs.
18
Okeke supra note 3 at 52-53.
19
Id.
14
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United States courts have also extended the application of the New York Convention to awards
rendered in the United States between foreign parties.20
Article 103 of the English Arbitration Act of 199621 provides for arbitration awards to be
enforced pursuant to the New York Convention and stipulates that recognition or enforcement of
these awards may not be refused except in specific instances which are based on the grounds
provided in the New York Convention.22 The Act does not distinguish between domestic and
international arbitral awards, but certain specific provisions relate solely to recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.23
While the English Arbitration Act is largely influenced by the provisions of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law's Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration of 1985 (hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law)24, Section 69 of the Arbitration Act
allows the parties to challenge an arbitration award on questions of law. If, however, the parties
agree to waive such appeal, a challenge may be brought only under the grounds specifically
listed in Section 68 of the Arbitration Act.25 Thus English Law provides the parties to the
arbitration an opportunity to agree (prior to the dispute) whether the English courts will have the
power to review the arbitral award on issues of law.26
Okeke supra note 3 at 52-53.
UK ST 1996 c 23 available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1996/1996023.htm.
22
Dan C. Hulea, Contracting To Expand the Scope of Review of Foreign Arbitral Awards: An American
Perspective, 29 Brook. J. Int'l L. 313, 343.
23
Id at 341.
24
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 544: “The UNCITRAL Model Law establishes six bases for setting aside awards.
They are: (1) invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate (2) lack of notice to a party or other inability to present the case
(3) inclusion in the award of matters outside the scope of submission (4) irregularity in the composition of the
tribunal (5) non-arbitrability of the subject matter (6) violation of domestic public policy”; see also The Text of the
Model Law available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/index.html.
25
Hulea, supra note 22 at 342-343
26
Id; Okeke, supra note 3 at 47-48.
20
21
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The arbitration rules of Germany are set forth in Book X of the ZPO (German Code of
Civil Procedure) (1985).27 The German arbitration laws are based on the UNCITRAL Model
Law.28 Similar to the English Arbitration Act, the German counterpart does not distinguish
between domestic and international arbitration. Regarding the grounds of review of awards, the
German statute provides a “definite and exclusive” list of grounds on which an award may be
challenged.29
Articles 1484 and 1502 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure (NCPC) contain very
specific provisions for setting aside arbitral awards and strictly stipulate that the setting aside of
an arbitral award is available only in those cases; if parties invoke any other grounds, the
reviewing court will not take those grounds into consideration because such grounds are not
provided under the law.30
In some countries such as Belgium, Switzerland and Sweden, judicial review of awards
in arbitrations not involving any nationals or residents could be excluded by agreement of the
parties, even for violation of the most basic procedural protections, the rationale behind such
exclusion being that judicial review can still be conducted at the place where enforcement of the
award is sought.31
Article 1717 of the Belgian Code Judiciaire, introduced in 1984, stipulated that Belgian
Courts had the authority to review an arbitral award only if at least one of the parties to the
dispute was either an individual having Belgian nationality or residence or a legal entity
Hulea, supra note 22 at 345.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Hulea, supra note 22 at 344; Okeke, supra note 3 at 49; for the text of the code visit
http://www.lexinter.net/ENGLISH/code_of_civil_procedure.htm.
31
BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 55; Shengchang & Lijun, supra note 10 at 179, where this trend has
been described as “Delocalization” or “Denationalization” of International Commercial Arbitration.
27
28

8
constituted in Belgium or had a subsidiary or other establishment in Belgium.32 Thus Article
1717 completely denied Belgian courts the authority to review international awards where the
parties were non-Belgian, even if the situs of the arbitration was Belgium.33 However, in 1998,
the Belgian Law “stepped back” from its approach to state that the parties may, by agreement,
exclude any application for the setting aside of an arbitral award, in case none of the parties had
their domicile, residence or principal place of business in Belgium.34
Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act lists very specific grounds for
non-recognition of an award.35 However, Article 192 of the same law gives parties the option to
agree to exclude one or all of those grounds, or to limit their recourse to one of the grounds
provided in Article 190 but it applies only to cases where none of the parties to the arbitration
have their domicile, residence, or principal place of business in Switzerland.36 Thus under Swiss
arbitration law, there is a difference between the judicial review of foreign arbitral awards and
domestic arbitral awards. The Swedish Arbitration Act contains similar provisions as the abovementioned Swiss Law.37

Shengchang & Lijun, supra note 10 at 179, BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 55
Hulea, supra note 22 at 346
34
Shengchang & Lijun, supra note 10 at 179, BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 55
35
Hulea, supra note 22 at 348.
36
Id.
37
Shengchang & Lijun, supra note 10 at 179: “Section 51 of the Swedish Arbitration Act 199 provides, inter alia,
that where none of the parties is domiciled or has its place of business in Sweden, such parties may in commercial
relationship through an express written agreement exclude or limit the application of the grounds for setting aside an
award… An award which is subject to such an agreement shall be recognized and enforced in Sweden in accordance
with the rules applicable to a foreign award.”
32
33
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B. Contractually Expanded Judicial Review

As detailed above, most national arbitration statutes set very narrow limits for the review
of arbitration awards.38 This factor, combined with the fear of arbitrary or “unprincipled”
arbitration awards has led some contracting parties to augment their arbitration agreements with
provisions expanding the scope of judicial review.39 Usually, such provisions call for judicial
vacatur of arbitral awards for errors of law, errors of fact, or both.40
National laws differ on whether or not to allow parties to contract for expanded judicial
review. The Arbitration Laws of England offer parties the possibility to expand judicial review
beyond the grounds listed in the New York Convention, provided enforcement is not sought
under the New York Convention, but under Articles 68 and 69 of the English Arbitration Act.41
Courts in the United States hold divergent opinions regarding contractually expanded
judicial review of awards. Some courts have held that since “Arbitration is a creature of
contract”, parties may contract to expand the review of awards.42 Other courts are of the opinion
that parties cannot alter court process to their own needs.43
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 545.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Hulea, supra note 22 at 342-343.
42
Id at 335-340; Margaret M. Maggio & Richard A. Bales, Contracting Around the FAA: The Enforceability of
Private Agreements to Expand Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 18 Ohio St. J. Disp. Res. 151 (2002); Recent
Case, Arbitration--Standard of Review--The Tenth Circuit Rejects Contractual Expansion of Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards: Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001), 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1267, 1272
(2002).
43
Smit, supra note 2; Brian T. McCartney, Note, Contracting for Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Can an
"Errors of Law" Clause Provide Two Bites of the Apple? 1997 J. Disp. Resol. 151, 151 (1997), Cynthia A. Murray,
Note, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 76 St. Johns L. Rev. 633 (2002); Kevin Sullivan, Comment, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 St. Louis L.J. 509 (2002).
38
39
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Unlike courts in the United States, French courts have not been asked to decide whether
to allow parties to contractually expand the judicial review of arbitral awards.44 In spite of this
situation, scholars believe that if presented with this issue, the French courts’ response to such
agreements would be in the negative.45 It is believed that in Germany, as in France, expanded
review of arbitral awards will probably not be available even if parties had contracted for it.46 In
the case of Belgian courts, experts believe that expanded judicial review will definitely not be
available47, as in the case of Swiss Courts.48

C. Conclusion

Judicial review in the country where recognition or enforcement is sought has gained
much uniformity due to the success of the New York Convention.49 In seeking enforcement of
the award, the winning party to the arbitration will have to obtain an exequatur (order to execute)
to render the award equivalent to a local court judgment, from the courts of the country where
the enforcement is sought.50 In such proceedings, foreign awards are usually not reviewed on the
merits but only on a limited number of grounds for procedural defects, which are more or less
similar to the grounds under Article V of the Convention.51
The New York Convention has been very successful in its efforts to provide a
harmonized system for the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards.
Hulea, supra note 22 at 344 -345.
Id.
46
Id at 345.
47
Id at 347.
48
Hulea, supra note 22 at 348.
49
BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 55.
50
Id.
51
Id.
44
45
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However, this success is not without defects.52 The Convention, while providing uniform
standards to decide the validity of arbitration agreements and awards,53 still leaves the
interpretation of the standards to the discretion of national courts.54 Further, the Convention fails
to provide a mechanism to solve the conflicts between national jurisdictions on matters relating
to arbitration.55 Thus, no mechanism exists till date which can secure the uniform application of
the provisions of the convention in national courts.56
Evidently, there is a need for a permanent body of arbitral appeal such as the AARB that
provides uniformity and singularity with respect to the appellate review of all arbitral awards.
The replacement of judicial review with a single appellate review mechanism will eliminate
much of the conflict, uncertainty and discrepancy that surround such review. Crucial
determinations as to the validity of arbitral awards and agreements will no longer be left to the
determination of national courts.57 Parties should contract that any option of review of an arbitral
award should be available only through the AARB. Once an arbitral award has been rendered,
any attempt to review the award may only be made through the AARB. There will be no
challenge of the award at the place where the award is rendered or anywhere else. Further, by
providing for a system of appeal that is reliable, parties will no longer fear unprincipled or
capricious awards and hence they will not opt for expanded review provisions.

BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 60.
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See id.
52
53
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROBLEMS OF REVIEWING ARBITRAL AWARDS IN COURTS - HOW APPEAL
THROUGH THE AARB WILL BE A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW

Several arguments have been advanced against subjecting international arbitral awards to
judicial review. The chief contentions are that judicial review leads to loss of confidentiality,
relegates expertly rendered awards to generalized review by judges, affects the institutional
integrity of the judicial and arbitral processes, adds additional burden to an already overworked
judiciary, subjects international awards to possibly biased national reviews and leads to the
problem of parallel proceedings.58 The following sections elaborate on these arguments.

A. Loss of Confidentiality

“People who want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When they call on the
courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution
by public (and publicly accountable) officials. Judicial proceedings are public
rather than private property.”59

Confidentiality is mentioned as one of the chief reasons why parties choose arbitration
over litigation. However, by involving courts in the proceeding, the parties acquire the risk of
“sacrificing the secrecy of the arbitral forum for the presumptive openness of the courtroom”.60
Highly confidential information of the parties will become known to competitors and others, and
Hulea, supra note 22, Okeke, supra note 3, Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 and Smit supra note 2.
Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time To Let Some Sun Shine In On Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 81 CHIKLR 463 (2006) quoting Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir.
2000).
58
59

13
the advantage of arbitral confidentiality will be completely lost.61 As Dore aptly describes,
“Once arbitration documents are filed with the court with a request for judicial action, they
become judicial records subject to the right of public access. As with other judicial records, the
court will assess whether the need for privacy outweighs any applicable public interest in
disclosure… neither the arbitrator’s order nor the parties’ confidentiality agreement will
necessarily bind the court”.62

National Laws and Confidentiality
The decision of the Australian High Court in Esso63 has been described as a “nuclear
event in Australia” whose “seismic tremors” were felt throughout the arbitration world.64 The
Esso court rejected the view that a general duty of confidentiality existed in arbitration
proceedings.65 The approach of the Esso court was followed by Sweden in the Bulgarian
Foreign Trade Bank66 case. In the United States, no federal court above the district court level
has ruled on this issue and the “handful” of district court decisions reject any implied duty of
confidentiality.67 This is demonstrated by the leading case of United States v. Panhandle Eastern
Corporation, 118 F.R.D. 346 (D.Del.1988). Thus it is evident that Australia, Sweden and the
United States do not recognize a general legal obligation of confidentiality.
Doré, supra note 59 at 507.
Knull & Rubins supra note 4 at 549.
62
Doré, supra note 59; see THE LEADING ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE TO ARBITRATION (Lawrence W.
Newman & Richard Hill eds., 2004) at 417-459.
63
Esso Auatralia Resources Ltd and others v. The Hon Sidney James Plowman, The Minister for Energy and
minerals and others, 10 Commonwealth Law Reports 183(1995).
64
Gordon Smith & Meef Moh, Confidentiality of Arbitrations - Singapore's Position Following the Recent Case of
Myanma Yaung Chi Oo Co Ltd v. Win Win Nu, 8 VJ 37 quoting Neill, P.,QC, “Confidentiality in Arbitration”,
(1996) 12 Arbitration International 287. This article was based on the 1995 Bernstein lecture given under the
auspices of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.
65
Id at 38.
66
Supreme Court, 27 October 2000, Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v. AI Trade Finance Inc, 15(11) Mealey’s
IAR B1 (2000), 13(1) WTAM 147(2001).
67
Jeffrey W. Sarles, Solving The Arbitral Confidentiality Conundrum In International Arbitration, available at
http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/publications/article.asp?id=1006&nid=6.
60
61

14
Although there is no statutory provision in the English Arbitration Act of 1996, English
law recognizes an implied term in arbitration agreements that the proceedings are private and
confidential subject to certain limited qualifications or exceptions.68 The cases of Dolling-Baker
v. Merrett,69 Hassneh Insurance Co. v. Mew70 and Ali Shipping v. Shipyard Trogir71 testify this.
The recent English Court of Appeals judgment in the Bankers Trust72case confirmed that court
proceedings which were related to arbitration were also confidential and the publication of a
court judgment connected to the arbitration was barred.73
France holds a “pro-confidentiality” stance. This can be witnessed from the notable case
of Aita v. Oijeh.74 In Aita, the Court of Appeal in Paris ruled that the very bringing of the
proceedings violated the principle of confidentiality and therefore ordered the challenging party
to pay significant costs to the other party for having caused in court a “bad faith” public debate
on matters which should have remained confidential between the parties.75
Two countries to statutorily provide for a duty of arbitral confidentiality are New Zealand
and Bermuda. Section 14 of the New Zealand Arbitration Act (1996) provides that “An Arbitral
agreement, unless other wise agreed by parties, is deemed to provide that the parties shall not
publish, disclose or communicate any information relating to arbitral proceedings under the
agreement or to an award made in those proceedings.”76 This enactment was done post Esso to
Sarles, supra note 67 at pages 3-4.
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70
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V.V. Veeder , The Transparency of International Arbitration in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006) at 92-98
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prevent the Australian Esso decision from serving as a precedent in New Zealand’s courts.77
However, in the subsequent case of TV New Zealand Ltd. v. Langley Productions Ltd,78 New
Zealand’s constitutional requirement for public court hearing was give precedence over a party’s
request for privacy and the details of a confidential arbitral award become public information.79
Another important example is the Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act
of 1993 which added two important provisions relating to confidentiality: Section 45 and Section
46.80 Between them, Sections 45 and 46 provide that any party to the proceedings may apply to
opt out of open court proceedings and there is no judicial discretion to hold hearing in an open
court. There is limited judicial discretion to direct that any information from a private hearing
can be published. The publication of any judgment of “major legal interest” is permitted subject
to the removal of names and other details of the case (if parties apply for such removal) and a
delay in publication, not to exceed ten years.81
As is evident, there exists a huge difference in the way countries treat confidentiality. The
words of Sarles aptly describe the situation:
“These national differences generate uncertainty. For example, one cannot simply
assume that an arbitration held in London will be universally subject to English
confidentiality standards, because a confidentiality dispute will not necessarily be
heard in the national courts of the arbitration situs. It might be raised in a pending
enforcement action elsewhere or in the country where the information is
disclosed.”82
It has been suggested that in countries which do not recognize an implied duty of confidentiality,
parties may expressly contract for it in their arbitration agreements.83 But the fact remains that
Sarles, supra note 67 at 4.
Television New Zealand v. Langley Productions Ltd [2000] 2 NZLR 250
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the parties, in their haste to “seal the deal”, often do not think that far ahead.84 Hence pre-dispute
arbitration agreements are often silent on the question of confidentiality. Even if parties did
incorporate provisions relating to confidentiality, there is no guarantee that national courts might
enforce those provisions.85
One strong argument that has been advocated against keeping all arbitration proceedings
confidential is that matters of public policy sometimes dictate the publicizing of certain
confidential information. If such information was withheld, it would detrimentally affect the
society at large.86 The American cases of Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Rite Aid Corp.87 and
Malek v. 24 Hour Fitness88 demonstrate this fact.89
The absence of uniform national standards on confidentiality strongly warrants the
establishment of a supranational body such as the AARB to ensure such uniformity and
confidentiality in arbitration proceedings. An ideal solution would be to incorporate strong
provisions to maintain party confidentiality with an equal regard for matters of public policy. In
Sarles, supra note 67 at 1.
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order to ensure that public welfare is not affected, confidentiality standards may be relaxed only
in cases that warrant the release of such information.

B. Lack of Expertise

The specialized expertise for which arbitrators are often selected and which is of pivotal
importance to the resolution of complex international disputes, is largely lost when review is
conducted by a national court of general jurisdiction because judges are unlikely to possess
extensive experience in dealing with technical details and other problems peculiar to
international disputes.90 Opponents of judicial review opine that one of the main disadvantages
of litigation is its failure to render suitable decisions for specialized disputes which require
resolution by a party with expertise in the area of dispute.91 The technically or scientifically
complex subject matter of many international transactions, added with the “interplay of legal
regimes that can complicate even a relatively simple cross-border sale of goods” may require
“expertise that is rarely found among judges, even in the most industrialized countries”.92
Opponents of judicial review also endorse the view that the prospect of (contractually)
expanded or heightened judicial review might deter arbitrators from giving highly specialized
solutions for which their help is sought, in the first place.

by satisfying the award, the successful plaintiff sued to reduce it to judgment. Both the arbitrator and the court
refused the health club's requests for confidentiality.”
90
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 550; Smit, supra note 2 at 152.
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In the words of Hans Smit:
It enables parties to obtain satisfactory resolution of disputes by sophisticated
arbitrators, especially selected for the purpose, by reference to legal rules that
might not meet with approval in the lower courts, but would require pursuing
appeals into the courts of highest instance. The contributions made by arbitrators,
specially selected for their expertise and competence, to the proper development
of the law should not be underestimated. Their ability to fashion creative solutions
by reference to rules that properly promote the common good, but may not always
be the ones endorsed by the (lower) courts, should be given free rein. Clearly,
arbitrators might shun reasonable solutions if they had to worry that courts might
not be willing or able to endorse the legal bases on which they rest. Arbitrators
have made very significant contributions both to finding appropriate solutions and
to promoting enlightened development of the law. Their readiness to do so would
be affected unfavorably by broadening the scope of review by judges not
specifically selected for their experience and independence.93
The Bowen94 decision supports the standpoint that an arbitrator chosen for his experience
in the area tends to possess greater knowledge about the disputed subject than “ordinary judges
or juries” thereby giving parties more confidence in the award rendered.95 However, through
contractually expanded judicial review, arbitrators might be required to submit findings of fact
and conclusions of law or be discouraged from seeking specialized solutions for fear that their
decisions would be vacated on appeal.96 In the opinion of the court, such a policy would
undermine the independence of the arbitrator and jeopardize the “simplicity, expediency, and
cost-effectiveness of arbitration”.97 Arbitration would become “just another step in the litigation
dance”.98 Additionally, contractually expanded review could put courts in the “awkward position
Smit, supra note 2 at 152.
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
95
Sullivan, supra note 43 at 553
96
Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review Of Arbitration Awards, 8 HVNLR 171,179 (2003), Bowen, 254
F.3d 925 at 936.
97
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of having to apply unfamiliar rules and procedures”.99 Other court decisions and commentators
have also expressed the importance of arbitrators’ expertise.100
While some commentators warn that arbitrators’ “familiarity with a discipline often
comes at the expense of complete impartiality”,101 courts themselves recognize the “tradeoff
between expertise and impartiality” in arbitration.102 It is acknowledged that arbitrators may have
had previous knowledge of the situation or the parties, but also presumed that they are
sufficiently impartial to serve as arbitrators.103
It must be said that the quality of an arbitration proceeding depends upon the quality of
the arbitrator.104 There will undoubtedly be a difference between an expert arbitrator’s appraisal
of a dispute and a judge’s appraisal of the same dispute. Hence, it is advisable to opt for appellate
arbitral review conducted by sophisticated technical and arbitral experts instead of judicial
review. One of the propositions for the AARB is to enlist the services of such experts to function
as arbitrators.

Bowen, 254 F.3d 925 at 935; Goldman, supra note 96 at 179.
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C. The Institutional Integrity Argument

The Institutional Integrity Argument is perhaps the most raised contention against
judicial review of arbitral awards. When parties decide that any unsatisfactory outcome of the
arbitration process may be settled by judicial review, they may tend to seek expanded judicial
review through contractual provisions.105 Expanded judicial review affects the institutional
integrity of the court process and any form of judicial review, contractually expanded or not
affects the integrity of the arbitral process. It is opined that “With respect to arbitral institutions,
the argument is the need to shield against undue interference by the judiciary. In the case of the
courts, institutional integrity presumably dictates that the freedom of parties to set the ground
rules in arbitration does not extend beyond the arbitral process itself”106.
Expanded judicial review sought by the parties has been both permitted107 and denied108
by American Courts which hold contrasting views on the institutional integrity argument as do
commentators who have both declined109 and endorsed110 the idea of contractually expanded
review.
See generally Fils et Cables D’Acier de Lens v.Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Gateway Tech. Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Bowen,
254 F.3d 925; Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003)(LaPine II) and
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. U.S. Phone Manufacturing Corp, 427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005) where parties sought
expanded judicial review through contractual provisions.
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Similarly, there exist divergent opinions as to whether the institutional integrity of arbitration is
affected by judicial review. Some commentators and courts111 observe that judicial review of an
arbitral award amounts to undue interference of the courts in the arbitral process, while others
opine that judicial review is a necessary tool to ensure the integrity of the arbitral process.112
The establishment of the AARB is advocated as a solution that addresses the both these
issues. By opting for review of awards to be conducted by the AARB, not only is the institutional
integrity of arbitration preserved by making it free of judicial interference, but the judiciary is not
subject to the whims and fancies of the contracting parties. The freedom of the contracting
parties will be limited to the arbitral process. Further, by providing for a system of appeal for
arbitral awards, there are significant chances to rectify erroneous or flawed awards, thereby
protecting the interests of the disputing parties and ensuring parties’ faith in the arbitral process.

D. Burden on the Judiciary

Much has been said about the role of arbitration as an efficient means of mitigating
congestion in the court system. Congress has acknowledged that arbitration is a quick and
relatively inexpensive method of dispute resolution that relieves the burden on the federal
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983) ( Stating that “The standards for judicial
intervention are ... narrowly drawn to assure the basic integrity of the arbitration process without meddling in it.”);
see Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1998); Knull supra note 4 at 548:
“Besides the potential lack of cross-border recognition of court orders to set aside awards, a losing party who
appeals to the judicial system of any country undermines the true virtues of arbitration, to some degree injecting
most of the disadvantages of the litigation process into arbitration at the appellate level. One European commentator
has remarked that “it appears that the institution of arbitration is distorted, and even loses the essence of its value, if
the arbitral procedure is followed by an external procedure before national tribunals.” At least one commentator has
suggested that parties who enter into an agreement to arbitrate their disputes breach that agreement whenever they
turn to courts for assistance not contemplated by the arbitration rules they have selected.”
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courts.113 In Timken Co. v. United Steelworkers, 492 F.2d 1178, 1180 (6th Cir. 1974) it was
opined that arbitration is “an expeditious and relatively inexpensive means of settling grievances
and ... it obviates the enormous burden which would rest upon the judiciary if it should be
required to settle, case by case, the endless number of grievances and disputes ...”. Chief Justice
Burger in his speech to the American Bar Association on Jan. 24, 1982, endorsed the use of
arbitration to reduce judicial backlog.114 Other commentators have also expressed the opinion
that arbitration reduces the burden on the court system.115 To quote, “Arbitration, along with
mediation and other forms of alternate dispute resolution, answers the public's need to resolve
disputes in an expeditious, cost-effective and just manner, without further burdening the taxsupported court system.”116 In the words of yet another commentator, “Whatever the original
justifications or purposes of ADR, arbitration's current support from the judiciary and other
federal and state entities, as well as the business community, is a function of two largely
economic purposes. First, from a public-interest perspective, arbitration is intended to reduce the
burden on courts, providing a “shift in cost from the public sector to private parties. Second, for
private parties, arbitration is said to provide a flexible dispute resolution model, allowing parties
to maximize efficiency.”117
While arbitration has the effect of lightening the burden on courts, the review of arbitral
awards in courts has quite the opposite effect. A frequently-raised argument against contractually
Goldman, supra note 96 at 183; H.R. Rep. No. 96, at 2 (1924).
H.R. Rep. No. 97-542 (1982); Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration Of Future
Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts Or A Trap For The Unwary Consumer? 5 Loy. Consumer L. Rep. 112 (1993) at
FN 9 mentioning the various articles of Warren E. Burger: Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way? 68 A.B.A.J.
274, 277 (Mar. 1982) Warren E. Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, 40 Arb.J. 3, 3 (Sept. 1985); Warren
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expanded judicial review is that it burdens an already overworked court system.118 The Bowen
court has opined that expanded review might encourage a number of additional appeals.119 This
would result in sacrificing the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration and further
burden an already overburdened judiciary.120
The La Pine court has opined that under expanded review, the reviewing court would be
engaging in work different from what it would do if it had simply heard the case itself.121 The
Eighth Circuit has observed that: “We have served notice that where arbitration is contemplated
the courts are not equipped to provide the same judicial review given to structured judgments
defined by procedural rules and legal principles. Parties should be aware that they get what they
bargain for and that arbitration is far different from adjudication”122 and “…parties may not force
reviewing courts to apply unfamiliar rules and procedures”.123
In stark contrast to these opinions other courts and commentators have opined that
(expanded) judicial review is not a burden on courts and that parties had the right to contract for
such review, thus exemplifying the divide on this subject. In so stating, they reason that without
judicial review, a party might so fear the work of a “maverick arbitrator” to give up the idea of
arbitration altogether.124 “Expanded review is more burdensome than the narrow review provided
for in Section 10 of the FAA. Nevertheless…it is quite possible that refusing to permit
Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without A Keel: Private Arbitration And The Need For Public
Oversight Of Arbitrators, 87 IALR 1337 (2002). The author, however, argues that “Whether growing delays actually
plague the public courts and whether arbitration achieves either of its economic purposes is debatable”.
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contractually expanded review will encourage parties to forego arbitration altogether and to
litigate their entire dispute in federal court.”125
It has also been stated that arbitration with expanded judicial review would place a lesser
burden on the judiciary than full litigation in the court system.126 Commentator Goldman
observes that: “Parties, by their agreement, are already permitted to increase the work of the
judiciary. Choice of law provisions may require judges to spend extra hours in the library.
Furthermore, clauses limiting which disputes are subject to arbitration also result in a heavier
judicial workload, yet no one suggests that such clauses are improper or undermine judicial
integrity”.127 He further reasons that “The fear that courts would be placed in the position of
applying unfamiliar standards of review or appraising strange rules and procedures is overstated
and does not justify a blanket rejection of clauses expanding judicial review. To date, every case
providing for expanded judicial review has required substantial evidence either to support the
arbitrator's award or to show that the arbitrator did not commit legal error. These are standards
that courts routinely apply. Finally, Section 10 of the FAA and the judicially created exceptions
to award confirmation already require courts to review arbitration awards. Expanded review does
not make the procedures and rules of arbitration any more unfamiliar.”128
While the opinion of courts is anything but uniform on this issue, an interesting fact is
that the same courts who found expanded review unacceptable have also endorsed the view of
parties opting for appellate arbitral review. While the contractual expansion of judicial review
Goldman, supra note 96 at 186.
La Pine Tech v Kyocera, 130 F.3d 884, 889; In re Fils Et. Cables D'Acier De Lens, 584 F. Supp. 240 at FN 9;
Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What To Do? Expanded Judicial Review Of Arbitral Awards, 52 UKSLR
429, 465: “Congress' intent in enacting the FAA was to permit parties' arbitration agreements to be enforced
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was not permissible, desirable or appropriate, parties that sought additional review could appoint
an appellate arbitration panel.129
Irrespective of whether courts consider the review of arbitral awards a burden or not,
review by an appellate arbitral body would definitely lighten their workload. The fact that courts
themselves advocate appellate arbitral review adds further merit to the idea of the establishment
of a body such as the AARB.

E. Potential for Bias in National Courts

One of the main reasons for parties to choose international arbitration is that it ensures
neutrality. There is a tendency for parties to presume, rightly or wrongly, that the national courts
of the opposing party would be biased against them or that judges are likely to be more
sympathetic to their own countrymen.130 To avoid the “potentially biased” national courts of
their opponents, parties in international commercial transactions enter into agreements that
prevent national courts from deciding their case and instead place decision-making power in the
hands of a neutral arbitral tribunal.131 By transferring decision making power from national
courts to a private arbitral tribunal, parties obtain a “uniquely neutral forum for resolving their
La Pine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Mayer, J., dissenting). Judge Mayer reasoned that the parties' only alternative for
expanded review was to provide for an appellate arbitration panel; Judge Posner, in Chicago Typographical Union.,
935 F.2d 1501 at 1504 -05, Judge Wollman in UHC Management, 148 F.3d 992, 998 and Judge Tascha in Bowen,
254 F.3d 925 at 934 all express the opinion that if the contracting parties seek broader appellate review, they can opt
for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's award instead of judicial review. See Eric Van Ginkel,
Reframing The Dilemma Of Contractually Expanded Judicial Review: Arbitral Appeal Vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPDRLJ
157.
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disputes”.132 However, the benefits conferred by such a neutral tribunal would be totally lost if
parties resorted to judicial review of the arbitral award in a national court with potential for bias
and corruption.
Evidence suggests that the fear of bias among parties is not totally unfounded, as the
detailed description of the following cases illustrates:
(1) Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia133
The dispute originally arose from an Energy Sales Contract (“ESC”) by which
CalEnergy was to develop and exploit geothermal resources in Indonesia and sell
the resulting energy to PLN, the Indonesian State Electricity Corporation. The
ESC was priced in dollars. In the wake of South East Asian financial crisis of the
late 1990s, and the collapse of the Indonesian Rupiah, PLN defaulted on its
payment obligations under the ESC. Pursuant to an UNCITRAL arbitration clause
in the ESC, CalEnergy brought arbitral proceedings and obtained an award in its
favor. Following PLN’s failure to make payment pursuant to the award rendered
against it, CalEnergy commenced further arbitral proceedings against the
Republic of Indonesia itself under letters of comfort issued by the Ministry of
Finance as security for PLN’s obligations under the ESC. These were also
UNCITRAL proceedings, and the seats were Jakarta. Following the
commencement of proceedings, the national oil company of Indonesia, Pertamina,
which although a party to the original ESC had not been a party to the PLN
arbitration and was not a party to the Republic of Indonesia arbitration, applied to
the Central Court of Jakarta seeking an injunction suspending arbitral proceedings
on grounds that were less than entirely clear. Pertamina alleged that its rights as a
third party would be affected by the arbitration. The Jakarta Court duly issued an
injunction, which in many respects was anomalous. The Arbitral Tribunal
declined to suspend the arbitration, and convened witness hearings in The
Hague.134 Following a failed attempt to obtain an injunction suspending the
proceedings in The Netherlands, agents of the Republic of Indonesia intercepted
one of the three arbitrators, an Indonesian national, at Schipol airport on the eve
of the witness hearings in The Hague. The arbitrator was in no position to resist
the pressures being brought to bear upon him, he was accompanied back to
Jakarta. In the face of these events, the Arbitral tribunal proceeded in truncated
form to render final awards against the Republic of Indonesia. The tribunal held
that the injunction of the local court did not constitute “sufficient cause”; that the
Rogers, supra note 130 at 409.
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legal basis for the injunctions was “unclear” and ultimately rendered its
decision.135
(2) Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic136
In 1988, Petrobart (a Gibraltan company) delivered a large quantity of gas to
Kyrgyzygazmunaizat (KGM), a company owned by the Kyrgyz Republic. After
KGM had failed to pay for all of the gas, Petrobart obtained a favorable decision
against it from a Kyrgyz Arbitration Court. Later, however, this court (with, it
appeared, the informal support of the government of the Kyrgyz Republic)
granted a stay of enforcement of that decision. KGM was then reorganized by
presidential decree so that its assets (but not its liabilities) were transferred to
other state entities, leaving the company insolvent. In 2003, Petrobart submitted a
Request for Arbitration to the SCC Institute alleging that the Kyrgyz Republic
was in breach of its obligations pursuant to the ECT. The tribunal first ruled that
the ECT applied on a provisional basis to Gibraltar and then held that the Kyrgyz
Republic failed to accord fair and equitable treatment to Petrobart's investment
and, therefore, was in breach of Article 10(1) of the ECT. In reaching this
conclusion, the tribunal highlighted the Kyrgyz Republic's decision to transfer
assets out of KGM to the detriment of its creditors (including Petrobart). The
tribunal also cited the State's intervention in the stay proceedings before the
Kyrgyz Arbitration Court (again, to the detriment of Petrobart). Indeed, that
intervention, the tribunal found, was itself a breach of the State's obligation to
provide an effective means for the enforcement of investment rights under its
domestic law (under Clause 10(12) of the ECT) In a final award issued under the
auspices of the Arbitration Institute for the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(the SCC Institute), recently made public, an arbitral tribunal upheld Petrobart
Limited's claim alleging breaches of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) by the
Kyrgyz Republic.137
In Sonatrach v. Ford, Bacon & Davis138, a Brussels court ordered execution of an ICC
award that had been set aside after a merits review by an Algerian court at the seat of arbitration
in Algiers. It is likely that the Belgian court suspected political interference at the arbitral situs
because the Algerian defendant was the national gas agency which was among the most powerful
of state agencies in Algeria.139
Partasides, supra note 130 at 150-153.
Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitral Award Case No. 126/2003, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
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The above-mentioned examples illustrate a certainty of bias, rather than a supposed
possibility. Sometimes the bias transgresses to the extent of actual, physical threat as the
Himpurna case illustrates. It must be noted that “possibility of bias” exists not only in the courts
of developing nations because of their “presumed lack of judicial independence or their
vulnerability to corruption”.140 Bias against foreign defendants is said to be present in all
countries, including the United States.141 Hence, if parties need to obtain a uniquely neutral, truly
transnational forum for appealing arbitral awards, an ideal solution would be an institution such
as the AARB. The neutrality and impartiality of the AARB would be yet another asset in the list
of the previously - mentioned several advantages.

F. The Problems of Parallel Proceedings

In international commercial arbitration proceedings, when a losing party seeks to set
aside or vacate an award on one hand and the winning party seeks to enforce the same award on
the other hand, it gives rise to parallel proceedings in different national courts, each with its own
laws and procedural standards.142 Litigants find it difficult to stay court proceedings in one
jurisdiction on the basis of ongoing litigation in another country.143 However, it must be
mentioned that parallel proceedings do not arise only in cases of post-award enforcement in
national courts; there are a number of other possibilities where parallel proceedings may occur in
international arbitration - for instance, between an international court and an international
Rogers, supra note 130 at 408-409.
Id.
142
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 537, see also BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 13; see Karaha
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tribunal, a state court and an international tribunal and between two arbitral tribunals.144 This is
due to the fact that there is no uniform standard for dealing with parallel proceedings
internationally.145
Attempts have been made to prevent parallel proceedings through the application of the
lis pendens doctrine. The doctrine of lis pendens (literally meaning suit pending) is a “general
principle of international law”146 which is invoked to prevent two judicial bodies from dealing
with the same dispute at the same time. While the doctrine of lis pendens has been successfully
applied to stall simultaneous proceedings in some cases147, there are also cases where its
application has been rejected.148

The Brussels and Lugano Conventions
The European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters of 1968 (hereinafter Brussels Convention)149 and the EFTA Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1988
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 537
Norah Gallagher, Parallel Proceedings, Res Judicata and Lis Pendens : Problems and Possible Solutions in
PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds.,
2006) at 331; see The Hub Power Company Limited v. Pakistan WAPDA and Federation of Pakistan, 16 Arb. Int'l
439 (2000), reprinted in 15 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. A-1 (2000); Benvenuti &Bonfant v. People’s Republic o f
Congo, ICSID Case No. ArB/77/2, VIII YBCA 144 (1983); Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas SA v. Colon
Container Terminal SA, Swiss Tribunal 14 May 2001, XXIX YBCA809 (2004); Southern Bluefin Tuna Case
Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, 4 Aug 2000, para 52, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/bluefintuna/award080400.pdf; Laker Airways, Ltd. v Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F. 2d 909, (D.C. Cir 1984), Donohue v. Amco Inc. and Others, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 649 (Q.B. 1999);
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(hereinafter Lugano Convention)150 have addressed the issue of simultaneous proceedings in an
attempt to bring uniformity among countries.151 The key feature of the lis pendens doctrine, as
set forth in the conventions is to prevent parallel proceedings and conflicting results in different
contracting states. Article 21 of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions152 provides that:
“Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same
parties are brought in courts of different Contracting States, any court other than
the court first seized shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time
as the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established. Where the jurisdiction of
the court first seized is established, any court other than the court first seized shall
decline jurisdiction in favor of that court.”153
As per the conventions, the court of the second filed action may not interfere with the
court of first filed action.154 In the United States, courts sometimes apply a presumption favoring
the first-filed suit, and this denotes the date of filing of the plaintiff's complaint with the court
clerk. There are no known cases in the United States where this is a problem.155 In Europe
however, the application of the “first-seized” rule is anything but conclusive.156 For instance, in
Sweden, the court is seized of jurisdiction when the case is filed, while in Germany, it is
perceived that jurisdiction is not seized until the defendant is served. This lack of uniformity is
described by the following example: “When a party sues a defendant in a German court but does
not immediately perfect service of process, the defendant can quickly sue in Sweden (assuming
the German plaintiff's amenability), and if the Swedish filing predates the German service of
process, the Swedish case prevails and the earlier-filed German case must be dismissed”.157
149
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This discrepancy among countries which are party to the Brussels conventions only
serves to illustrate the lack of uniformity among national laws and its direct bearing on
international arbitration proceedings.158
Lis pendens rules often apply only to parallel actions involving the same parties and the
same claims or causes of action. It is unclear as to how “same” they must be to qualify for a stay
or dismissal.159 The degree of requisite “sameness” is apparently left to the discretion of the
judges in the absence of any guidelines to evaluate the “sameness”.160 Another key issue is that
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions rules apply only to participating nations. Therefore, there
are no provisions to deal with simultaneous proceedings when one of the contracting states is not
a party to the conventions.161
As with other problems in international commercial arbitration today, there are no
uniform measures to effectively address the issue of parallel proceedings. While the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions are undoubtedly steps in the right direction162, there are still areas that have
not been satisfactorily addressed, as described above.
It has been suggested that the complete harmonization of the lis pendens issue can be
achieved by an international convention to that effect.163 Instead, the problem of parallel
proceedings and related issues of enforcement due to simultaneous proceedings in national courts
or otherwise can be addressed with the same solution that has been advocated to several other
problems in this thesis – the establishment of the AARB.164 If parties agree through well-defined
Balkanyi-Nordmann, supra note 145 at 191;George, supra note 151 at 531.
George, supra note 151 at 510.
160
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provisions to bring any requests for appeal to the AARB only and waive the right to pursue any
other appeal option, the “perils”165 of parallel proceedings will be eradicated.

G. Conclusion

The above-mentioned arguments clearly highlight the fact that subjecting arbitral awards
to judicial review creates certain distinct problems, both to the arbitrating parties and the
institution of arbitration. It is evident that by resorting to appellate review through the AARB,
arbitrating parties and the institution of arbitration will be free from the problems posed by
judicial review.

165
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CHAPTER 4
THE NEED FOR THE AARB
“Lack of appeal does not bring finality.”166

Considering the disadvantages posed by judicial review and the merits of appellate
arbitral review as detailed above, it is not unreasonable to assume that parties who are prepared
to agree to international arbitration but desire some protection against arbitrary awards would
prefer an arbitral review to judicial review.167 Currently there is no universal extra-judicial body
for dealing with appellate review of all international commercial arbitral awards.

A. Existing Avenues of Appellate Arbitral Review

As previously mentioned, the losing party in arbitration can seek an appeal of the award
in national courts at the place of arbitration or enforcement168 or with the institution that rendered
the award. Most national statutes provide extremely limited grounds for judicial review of
arbitral awards169 and courts are divided on the concept of contractually expanded review.170
Similarly, most major arbitral institutions provide extremely limited grounds of review for
awards rendered by them. While the appeal provisions of most institutions include measures to
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 542.
Id at 550.
168
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169
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170
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correct clerical or mathematical errors171, they do not contain any provisions to review or alter
the merits of the award172, even if the decree is based on flawed reasoning, incorrect application
of the law173 or contains substantive errors174. James M. Gaitis mentions several possible
scenarios of misapplication of law:
“The arbitral tribunal might wrongly determine that the applicable law does not
permit an award of prejudgment interest in a particular arbitration, or the tribunal
might apply an incorrect statute of limitations. The tribunal might inadvertently
fail to recognize that the parties’ contract mandates, and the law permits, an award
of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, or might misinterpret the law relating to
fiduciary duties. The tribunal might misapprehend the doctrine of respondeat
superior, or incorrectly describe the force and effect of administrative regulationsfor example, oil and gas regulations regarding the correlative rights of interest
owners. Allusions to the law of other jurisdictions, and the ensuing reliance on the
law of those jurisdictions, might be based on a misunderstanding of that law. The
tribunal might incorrectly conclude dicta in a decision actually constitute a formal
holding. Simple statutes and complex bilateral investment treaties might be
misread, and the language of cases and statutes alike might be misquoted and
misapplied”.175
In addition to the above-mentioned possibilities, there is also the risk that an arbitrator
“grossly misinterprets a contract or grants hugely disproportionate remedies”.176 In several high
profile and “untold” lower profile arbitrations, arbitrators have rendered decisions that have
fallen well outside the expectations of the parties.177 There may be other justifiable reasons why
parties may seek to appeal an award. The appeal mechanisms of existing arbitral institutions do
not provide appellate provisions that address the above-mentioned scenarios.178
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B. Rules of Various Arbitration Institutions

Article 29 of the International Chamber of Commerce (1998) (hereinafter ICC) Rules of
Arbitration179 states that “On its own initiative, the Arbitral Tribunal may correct a clerical,
computational or typographical error, or any errors of similar nature contained in an Award,
provided such correction is submitted for approval to the Court within 30 days of the date of
such Award”. There are no provisions whatsoever to alter incorrect applications of law or
objective evidence.180 The provisions of Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Model Law181 are
identical to the above-mentioned provisions of ICC Article 29. The Model Law does not provide
recourse to review or alter awards on any other basis.182
The rules of other Arbitration Institutions, such as Article 27 of the London Court of
International Arbitration (1998) (hereinafter LCIA)183 and Article 66 of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (hereinafter WIPO) Arbitration Rules184 provide that the arbitral tribunal
may correct awards containing computational, typographical or clerical errors only.185 As in the
case of the ICC Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules, they do not provide for other recourse to
review or alter the award. However, the rules of both the LCA and the WIPO provide that a party
may request the Arbitral Tribunal to make an additional award as to claims or counterclaims
E.g., Hyle vs. Doctor’s Associates Inc.,198 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1999).
International Chamber of Commerce Available at
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presented in the arbitration but not determined in any award within thirty days of rendering the
award.186
Art. 37 of the Rules of Arbitration, Institute of Stockholm Chamber Of Commerce
(1999)187 contains similar provisions in providing that the tribunal may correct miscalculation or
clerical error, provide written interpretation of award, or decide additional questions submitted
but not previously decided.188 The Rules of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Association (IACAC)189 are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law provisions and contain similar
provisions.190
The provisions relating to appeal of awards of the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (hereinafter ICSID) are contained in Chapter VII of the ICSID Rules under
“Interpretation, Revision and Annulment of the Award.”191 Under these provisions, a losing
party may request the Chairman of the ICSID’s Administrative Council to appoint a threemember panel to review an award.192 While the scope of review of awards is limited,193 it is
certainly more elaborate than any of the aforementioned rules. Article 52 of the ICSID
Convention Rules provides that an award may be reversed under the following conditions: that
the Tribunal was not properly constituted; that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; that there has been a serious
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or that the award has failed to state the reasons
on which it is based.194 It is apparent that grounds for overturning an award are narrowly
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 543; Gaitis supra note 171 at 25.
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constructed under the ICSID rules.195 The ICSID does not offer expedited appeal of awards, and
the appeal proceedings are similar to original proceedings in all aspects.196 Article 53 of the
ICSID convention states that “(t)he award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject
to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention”, thereby
excluding the possibility of any judicial review of the award.197
The Center for Public Resources (hereinafter CPR) based in New York is the first major
private commercial arbitration institution to establish separate, optional rules governing appeals
procedures.198 The CPR’s appeal procedures are limited to arbitrations conducted in the United
States.199 The Appeal Procedure of the CPR provides broad grounds of appeal in comparison
with the rules of other institutions.200 The CPR rules provide that the appeals tribunal may annul
the original award and replace it with a new, binding decision.201 Rule 8 of the CPR provides the
following six grounds of appeal based on which the original award may be modified or set aside:
(1) If the original award contains material and prejudicial errors of law of such a nature that it
does not rest upon any appropriate legal basis;
(2) The award is based upon factual findings clearly unsupported by the record;
(3) If the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;
(4) If there is evident partiality or corruption in arbitrators;
(5) If arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed powers;
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 552.
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(6) If the arbitrators are guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, or refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or any other misbehavior by which the
rights of a party are prejudiced.202
From the above-mentioned analysis of the rules of various institutions, it is apparent that
the existing major arbitral institutions do not offer the option of an appeal procedure to parties
even in cases of erroneous misapplication of law or other justifiable circumstances, leaving
parties no option but to seek appeal in courts.203 Since national courts also limit the grounds of
review, the party afflicted by such “maverick” arbitration awards is often left with no recourse.
As an alternative, parties may opt for ad hoc arbitral tribunals to hear their appeals. However, ad
hoc arbitration does not offer certain advantages to parties that are available with institutional
arbitration. The advantages and disadvantages of ad hoc tribunals as compared to institutional
arbitration are detailed in the following pages.

C. Ad hoc vs. Institutional Arbitration

Arbitration may be classified into two types based on the method in which the arbitral
proceedings are conducted: ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration.204 Ad hoc arbitration
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 555.
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22391079, *1 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., Oct. 21, 2003 (tribunal, “through oversight,” failed to provide for a contractually
agreed setoff valued at $800,000) Monscharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 28 (Cal. 1992) ( held that award will
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may be defined as arbitration without formalized rules or procedures; that has been specifically
engineered for the particular agreement or dispute205; it is arbitration which is not conducted or
administered by any institution or according to the rules of any institution206. Institutional
arbitration, as is evident, is arbitration administered or conducted by an existing institution,
according to the rules of that institution.207 The rules relating to the arbitration proceedings208
and the extent of involvement in the administration of the arbitration varies with each
institution.209 There are advantages and disadvantages to both these systems.

D. Advantages of Ad hoc Arbitration

The defining characteristic of ad hoc arbitration is that it is independent of any
institution.210 Ad hoc arbitration processes do not possess any procedures for conducting
arbitration proceedings; parties have the freedom to choose any procedure and law that they
desire.211 In cases where the parties do not choose the applicable rules, the arbitrators tend to
See www.edcostello.com.
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conduct the proceedings in a manner that they deem appropriate.212 The advantages of ad hoc
arbitration are as follows:
(1) The chief advantage of ad hoc arbitration is flexibility. As described above, an ad hoc
procedure can be shaped to meet the needs and requirements of the parties and the facts of the
particular dispute.213 Ad hoc arbitration is also a good alternative when parties cannot agree on
an arbitration institution.214
(2) Another advantage of ad hoc arbitration is that parties to the arbitration have more control
over the procedure rather than be subjected to the control of the administering institution.215
(3) Yet another advantage is significant savings in terms of costs and time for the parties. Since
most arbitration institutions charge administrative fees, parties can save on such fees and other
associated costs when they opt for ad hoc arbitration. Similarly, parties can save time by
avoiding the internal procedures and other time periods associated with institutional
arbitration.216
The promulgation of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules217 gave a major boost to ad hoc
arbitration.218 Adopted by UNCITRAL on 28 April 1976, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
provide a comprehensive set of procedural rules upon which parties may agree for the conduct of
arbitral proceedings arising out of their commercial relationship; prior to the establishment of the
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rules, parties had to draft their own procedures or rely on arbitrators to provide the procedures.219
The Rules and are widely used in many ad hoc arbitrations (as well as administered
arbitrations).220 The Rules cover all aspects of the arbitral process, providing a model arbitration
clause, setting out procedural rules regarding the appointment of arbitration and the conduct of
arbitral proceedings and establishing rules in relation to the form, effect and interpretation of the
award221 and can be regarded as a substitute for the rules of Arbitral Institutions. The rules can be
readily adopted by parties.222 Other recent alternatives for ad hoc arbitrations include the
“Permanent Court of Arbitration Rules Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two
Parties of Which Only One is a State” promulgated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration223 and
the rules for non-administered international arbitrations published by the CPR Institute for
Dispute Resolution.224
Ad hoc arbitration requires the complete cooperation of the parties and their legal
representatives.225 In the words of Alan Redfern, “if such cooperation is forthcoming, the
difference between ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration is like the difference between a
tailor made suit and one which is bought off the peg”.226 Such cooperation is, however, difficult
to achieve when parties are at odds with each other and given such a situation, parties will not
reach an agreement on any issue, leave alone issues of choice of laws or administrative
procedures.227
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With ad hoc arbitrations there exists a dilemma in drafting the dispute resolution clauses:
“Before the dispute arises, the parties lack the necessary information about the dispute to really
cover all aspects that might become irrelevant-unless they cover every contingency, which, if not
impossible, will be too expensive to do. And once the dispute has materialized, the parties are
often too much at odds with each other-and may be too preoccupied with tactical considerationsto reach agreement about the many issues that have to be covered.”228 This dilemma does not
exist in institutional arbitration in that the dispute resolution rules drafted by institutions are
detailed enough to cover a wide variety of situations.229 More importantly, the institution
provides for a neutral authority that can resolve procedural issues and deadlocks.230
Another disadvantage of ad hoc arbitration is that in cases where the parties do not
choose the applicable rules, the arbitrators tend to conduct the proceedings in a manner that they
deem appropriate.231 This lends much unpredictability to the outcome of the proceedings. Most
importantly, ad hoc arbitration lacks the predictability, security and administrative effectiveness
that reputed established arbitration institution offer.232
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E. Advantages of Institutional Arbitration

The chief advantages of Institutional Arbitration are as follows:
(1) In institutional arbitration, parties can “take comfort” in the well established rules and
procedures of the institution. There is a sense of security and guarantee when the arbitration
proceedings are handles by an institution of repute.233
(2) The arbitrators appointed or suggested by institutions are well-qualified to resolve the dispute
at hand. Institutions typically follow a thorough selection process when selecting arbitrators.234
(3) Parties do not have to concern themselves with various aspects of handling the arbitration.
The administration of the arbitration process is dealt with in a professional and experienced
manner. The institution will provide a wide variety of services that cannot be matched by ad hoc
arbitration.235
Arbitral institutions gain judicial respect by virtue of their proven track record in
handling arbitration proceedings. When the institution has an established record of handling all
procedural and substantive aspects of the arbitration in a meritorious and thorough manner,
courts are inclined to confirm the awards rendered by that institution.236 This is a singular
advantage of institutional arbitration over ad hoc arbitrations. A key benefit is the increasing
recognition of arbitral institutions by national courts and the evidence of increasing judicial
See LEW ET AL., supra note 1at 3-21, see also BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 36.
BÜHRING-UHLE, ET AL supra note 8 at 36; Asken, supra note 210 at IV; LEW ET AL., supra note 1at 3-21,
3-22.
234
Asken, supra note 210 at IV.
235
Id.
236
Asken, supra note 210 at IV, explaining the deference of courts to arbitration institutions as follows: “Several
institutions have enjoyed notable success due to their long and proven track records. England has accepted the
reference to ICC Rules as evidencing an intent to opt out of appeals to the national courts of that country. The U.S.
Supreme Court permitted the ICC and American Arbitration Association (AAA) to file amicus curiae briefs as
friends of the court on the procedures of international arbitration in the most important international arbitration
232
233

44
deference to established arbitration institutions can be witnessed from a number of cases.237 On
the other hand, the advantages of an institutional award only materialize when the award is not
contradicted by a national court which vacates or refuses to enforce the award; there have been
instances where awards of established institutions were rendered obsolete by national courts.238
Many international practitioners advocate institutional arbitration rather than ad hoc
arbitration.239 Their recommendation is based on the enhanced predictability and regularity that
institutional arbitration provides, apart from the benefits of incorporating institutional rules.240
Though the advantages of institutional arbitrations outweigh the advantages of ad hoc arbitration,
it remains that parties do not have sufficient recourse to appeal in the existing arbitration
institutions.241 In such cases, and cases where parties do not wish to opt for ad hoc appeal, they
will have no option but to choose the court system. Hence, it is imminent that we provide a
source of appellate arbitral relief through a supranational institution that provides the security
and guarantee of a court system within the realm of the arbitration system itself. The
establishment of the AARB will undoubtedly provide the much-needed effective, predictable,
secure and reputable source of appeal of arbitral awards.

decided in the U.S. in the last decade. Indeed, the Supreme Court in that case cited to the ICC’s brief in expanding
the range of issues resolvable in international arbitration.” See BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 8 at 38.
237
Asken supra note 210 mentioning the following cases: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. V. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 3346, (1985); Arab African Energy Corp. Ltd. V. Olieprodukten Nederland B.V., [1983] Lloyd's Rep. 419
(Q.B.); Appollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg., 886 F.2d 469, 473-74 (1st Cir. 1989); Daiei, Inc. v. United States Shoe
Corp., 755 F.Supp. 299, 303 (D. Haw. 1991) and Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v.. Carte Blanche
International Ltd., 888 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1989).
238
See S.P.P. (Middle East) Ltd. And Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. v. The Arab Republic of Egypt and the
Egyptian General Organization for Tourism and Hotels, 22 I.L.M. 752 (1983); BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra
note 8 at 37.
239
BORN, supra note 211 at 59: “Many international arbitration practitioners fairly decisively recommend
institutional arbitration, rather than ad hoc arbitration. They do so primarily because of the enhanced predictability
and regularity that institutional arbitration provides, as well as the benefits of incorporating institutional rules (e.g.,
provisions concerning formation of the arbitral tribunal, limitations on judicial review). Particularly at the outset of
an arbitration, between sometimes inexperienced parties from different legal cultures, an institution’s role in moving
proceedings along can be highly constructive and efficient.”
240
Id.
241
Infra at pages 34-39.
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F. Conclusion

Arbitration is a system of dispute resolution that has been created on the fundamental
bases of “efficiency” and “finality”.242 The failure of major arbitration institutions to provide an
appellate review procedure can be attributed to the belief that appellate review of awards
undermines the efficiency of the arbitration system in addition to toying with the finality of the
award.243 However, in their quest to protect arbitration, those institutions have failed to provide
an effective means for the rectification of awards that may be based on flawed reasoning or
contain substantive errors or be well outside the scope of the arbitrator’s decision-making
powers.244 Instead of adding strength to the system of arbitration, this has resulted in parties
turning the other way and looking upon the judicial system to address issues that could have well
been addressed within the arbitral system.245 As a way of ensuring fairness in the system of
arbitration and balancing the best interests of the arbitrating parties with the fundamental
integrity of the arbitration process, appellate review of arbitral awards must be incorporated
within the system of arbitration. The establishment of the AARB arbitration will undoubtedly
achieve that result.

Gaitis, supra note 171 at 13.
Id.
244
Infra at pages 34-39.
245
Id at page 39.
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CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE AARB

The AARB must be modeled on principles of finality of the award, easy enforcement and
recognition, binding decisions on member states, speedy and cost effective resolution, arbitrators
with expertise, a neutral system of laws, impartial arbitrators bound by a strong moral code,
equal representation of arbitrators and reasonable scope of review, all of which have been
mentioned as the important advantages of arbitration.246 Establishing the AARB on the suggested
principles will make it an ideal source of appeal for arbitral awards rendered throughout the
world. Just as countries need the AARB for the regulating and unifying the appeal of arbitral
awards, the AARB needs the ratification of countries in order to be established. Hence, it is
See Newman & Hill, supra note 62 at 416: According to the opinion of arbitration experts, the most important
and valuable advantages of arbitration are the following: “neutral forum, international enforcement by treaty,
confidential procedure, expertise of the tribunal, lack of appeal, limited discovery, speed, more amicable, greater
degree of voluntary compliance, less costly procedure and more predictable results”; see also William S. Fiske,
Should Small And Medium-Size American Businesses “Going Global” Use International Commercial Arbitration?
18 TRNATLAW 455 (2005) at 461-462, where the author mentions the following as reasons why arbitration is
chosen over litigation: “The trend towards arbitrators, rather than judges, is increasing for a number of reasons.
First, arbitration is a very private process compared to public trials that generate public records. Second, parties can
agree the dispute resolution procedure will be neutral with regard to the nationality of the arbitrators, applicable law,
venue, and language. Third, disputes arising from complex international agreements are best handled by arbitrators
with expertise in the relevant field, rather than potentially biased and unsophisticated judges and juries. Fourth,
arbitration is generally an affordable alternative to costly adjudication. Fifth, specialized types of arbitrations are
available for quick and efficient arbitral procedures, which is ideal for transnational businesses that aim to keep
operations running as usual. In comparison, public courts often have heavy caseloads that retard issue resolution.
Sixth, arbitrators are generally interested in reaching a decision through a process that preserves the ongoing
business relations between the parties. This emphasis on flexibility to the parties' needs contrasts with a common
law adversarial system that encourages "dyed-in-the-wool, hard-edge, brass knuckles U.S. litigation tactics" that
often destroy business relationships. Seventh, parties are able to contract for the substantive and procedural law
governing the arbitration. Their choice of law selection is overwhelmingly respected by arbitration institutions,
arbitrators and courts enforcing the arbitral award. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, contracting for arbitration
restricts disputes to the arbitration forum. An institutional arbitration award ensures the arbitrator's decision will be
enforceable in many public court systems. The accelerated use of international commercial arbitration suggests its
framework supplies fairness, privacy, predictability, finality, and other transborder business needs.”
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important that the AARB indoctrinates features that will make it viewed upon as the source of
arbitral appeal by countries around the world.

A. Finality of the Award: Waiver of Judicial Recourse

One of the main purposes of arbitration is to achieve a final and binding determination of
a dispute. In order to ensure finality of the award, it is suggested that parties to the arbitration
governed by the AARB must agree to waive or relinquish the right to judicial or any other form
of recourse.247 This waiver of the right to judicial recourse will render the award final and
binding on the parties.
Article 64(a) of the WIPO rules provides that when parties agree to arbitration under that
system, they will be deemed to have waived their right to an appeal or recourse to a court or
other judicial authority.248 However, the parties may waive their right to appeal only “to the
extent that such a waiver is valid under the applicable law.”249
The ICSID Convention provides for complete waiver of judicial recourse,

through

Article 53 which states that “[T]he award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject
to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.” Thus,
appeals may not be sought in national courts. The Washington Convention binds all member
states to ensure that their courts recognize and enforce ICSID awards.250
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 562
Christopher Gibson, Awards and Other Decisions, 9 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb.181 at 199-200, see exception to the rule
at FN 62: “Note, however, that concerning interim measures of protection or security for claims and costs, Article
46(d) of the WIPO Rules provides in pertinent part that a request for such relief addressed to a judicial authority
“shall not be deemed incompatible with the Arbitration Agreement.”
249
Id at 200: “This form of wording carries with it the implication that the waiver of all forms of appeal is not
always permissible, and the impact of the law of the place of arbitration must be considered.”
250
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 552.
247
248
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Thus, when parties are bound by rules of a convention to waive appeals, the award
rendered is indeed final and binding and the parties cannot seek further review. In order to give
finality to the awards rendered by the AARB, the waiver of right to appeal must be indoctrinated
in the rules relating to its establishment. The AARB must be established by an international
convention which will bind on all signatory counties and the courts of participating states will
also be required to recognize and enforce the awards of the appellate body.251

Recourse in Cases of Erroneous Awards
While all care will be taken to ensure that the awards rendered by any tribunal of the
AARB are meritorious and devoid of errors, there should still be sufficient recourse available in
case or erroneous or flawed awards. If an award rendered by the AARB is deemed erroneous or
flawed (after a thorough determination), the remedial options available include reform of the
existing award, issuing a new award replacing the erroneous award or reversal of the award.252

B. Choice of Law for the AARB

The idea of establishing a permanent body of arbitral appeal comes with the question of
appropriate choice of law for the arbitration proceedings. Keeping in mind the varied legal
See Holtzmann, supra note 6 at 112; see also Schwebel, supra note 6 at 116 – 119; see RUBINOSAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9 and Newman & Hill, supra note 62 at 416.
252
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 563: The scope of remedies available to an arbitral appeals panel is as important
an aspect of a review system as the review itself. Should such a panel decide that an award is erroneous, there are a
number of actions that it could take, and the parties should agree at the outset which of these options will be
available to the appellate panel, to avoid disputes over the appeal tribunal’s authority and to better reflect the parties’
preferences with regard to economy and accuracy. If an award is flawed but not fatally so, an appeal tribunal could
be empowered to reform the award, or to issue a new award replacing the erroneous one. Alternatively, the award
could be reversed and remanded, either to the original panel or, in some rare circumstances where the original
arbitrators were unavailable or somehow suspect or disqualified given the issues on appeal, to a new panel, with
instructions on how errors were to be corrected. This list of components of a potential appeal option is in no way
251
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backgrounds of the participants in international commercial arbitration proceedings, the adoption
of a system of laws that does not conform to one country or region but is instead of a
transnational253 or a-national254 nature seems a wise choice.
There is an emerging trend towards the codification and adoption of transnational laws or
lex mercatoria255 in international trade and commercial disputes.256 The terms “lex mercatoria”
and “transnational laws” are used synonymously with the terms “transnational commercial law”,
“principles common to several legal systems” and international trade usages”.257 In the words of
Emmanuel Gaillard, “[T]he validity of choosing general principles of law - also frequently
referred to as transnational rules or lex mercatoria- to govern an international contract is widely
accepted in international commercial arbitration today”.258 The increasing acceptance of
transnational rules can be witnessed from recent decisions of arbitration institutions259 and
national courts260.

exclusive and additional research and discussion among practitioners and corporate counsel will be required to draft
effective clause language and evaluate the practical results of all options.
253
See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, The Rise of Transnational Legal Practice and The Task of Comparative
Law, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 1215 (2001) and Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 629 (1989); see also
RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.10
254
Id.
255
Lex Mercatoria has been defined as “A body of principles and regulations applied to commercial transactions and
deriving from the established customs of merchants and traders rather than the jurisprudence of a particular nation or
state” by www.answers.com. www.wikipedia.com defines Lex Mercatoria as follows: “The Law Merchant, or Lex
Mercatoria, was originally a body of rules and principles laid down by merchants themselves to regulate their
dealings. It consisted of usages and customs common to merchants and traders in Europe, with slightly local
differences. It originated from the problem that civil law was not responsive enough to the growing demands of
commerce: there was a need for quick and effective jurisdiction, administered by specialized courts”.
256
Stephen Jagusch, Recent Codification Efforts: An Assessment, in IAI SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION NO.3. TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique
Schlaepfer, Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 2005) and see generally all other authors in the same book.
257
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at pages 18-46.
258
Jagusch, supra note 256 at 65.
259
Matthias Scherer, The Recognition of Transnational Substantive Rules by Courts in Arbitral Matters, in IAI
SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NO.3. TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique Schlaepfer, Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 2005) at 95-100
mentioning the following cases: See Sept. 1, 1988 Partial award in ICC Case No. 5953, Compania Valenciana de
Cementos Portland SA (Spain) v. Primary Coal Inc. (US), 1990 Rev. ARB. 701, Oct 26; 1979 Award in ICC Case
No. 3131, Pabalk Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor, 1983 REV. ARB.525; Final Award in ICC Case No. 3572,
Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH. v. Government of the State of R’as Al Khaimah (UAE) & the
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Goldman’s definition of lex mercatoria is particularly relevant to the context of
international commercial arbitration: “Lex mercatoria would thus, irrespective of its origin and
the nature of these sources, be the law proper to international economic (commercial) relations.
One would encompass not only transnational customary law, whether it is codified or not (and in
the latter case revealed and clarified by arbitral awards) but also law of an interstate, or indeed
State, which relates to international trade.”261 Goldman’s definition goes on to mention that the
Hague Conventions of 1964262, the Vienna Convention of 1980263, the Conventions establishing
Uniform Laws for the International Sale of Goods264 and national laws that specifically dealt
with international trade would all be part of lex mercatoria.265
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts(hereinafter the
UNIDROIT Principles)266, the Principles of European Contracts267 and the CENTRAL List of
Lex Mercatoria Principles, Rules and Standards (hereinafter CENTRAL List )268 constitute
efforts at the codification of transnational laws relating to international commercial disputes,
R’as Al Khaimah Oil Co. (Rakoil), XIV Y.B. COM. ARB. 111 (1989); May 5, 1997 Final Award in ICC Case No.
7365.
260
Id mentioning the following cases: CA Paris, July 13, 1989, Compania Valenciana de Cementos Portland v.
Primary Coal, 1990 REV. ARB. 663; Cass. Le civ., Oct.22 1991, Compania Valenciana de Cementos Portland v.
Primary Coal Inc., 1992 REV. CRIT. DIP. 113; Austrian Sup. Ct (Oberster Gerichtshof), Nov. 18, 1992, Norsolor v.
Pabalk, 1983 REV. ARB. 516(1983), 110 J.D.I. 645 (1983); CA Paris, Dec. 15, 1981, Norsolor v. Pabalk Ticaret
Sirketi, 1983 REV. ARB. 465; Court of Appeal, Mar. 24, 1987, Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft
mbH. v. R’as Al Khaimah Oil Co. (Rakoil), [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.246, [1987] All E.R. 769; House of Lords, June
23, 1998 [1998] 3 W.L.R. 230, 27 I.L.M. 1032 (1998), 3 (7) INT’L ARB. REP 3 and AI (1998) (The House of
Lords reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision on other grounds but did not contradict the reasoning relating to the
application of “internationally accepted principles of law”); United States District Court, Southern District of
California, Dec7 1998, Ministry of Defence and Support for the Armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v.
Cubic Defense Systems, 29 F. Supp.2d 1168(S.D. Cal 1998); LEW ET AL., supra note at 18-50, 18-51; CRAIG ET
AL, supra note 190 at § 5.05, 5.06.
261
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 18-47.
262
Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, (1964), (ULIS), Convention Relating
to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (1964) (ULF).
263
The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980 (Vienna Sales Convention, 1980).
264
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (Apr. 1980) (CISG).
265
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 18-47.
266
UNIDROIT (or the International Institute for Unification of Private Law) available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/home.htm.
267
Available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/textef.html.
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given that there is an increasing number of commercial relationships that would benefit from the
application of transnational laws as opposed to a single national law.269 Each of these three
principles has its own advantages and disadvantages.270 While the Central List represents a more
contemporary approach to the codification of transnational law, the UNIDROIT principles and
principles of European Contracts have evolved over time.271 In consideration of which of these
codes is the “favorite”, it appears that the UNIDROIT principles are preferred over the other
two.272
Any of these principles may serve the purposes of the AARB or the AARB may create its
own code of transnational principles. In creating such code, national laws that deal with
international trade, customary practice, relevant international conventions and the laws of arbitral
institutions may all be sources of inspiration.273 In creating a code for the appellate institution,
we should bear in mind that the code should be acceptable to participants from varied national
backgrounds.

C. Framework of the AARB

The main rationale behind the AARB is to create an institution of appeal whose decisions
have a binding effect. Since the rules of supranational bodies or conventions have binding effect
268

Available at http://tldb.uni-koeln.de/php/pub_show_toc.php.
Jagusch, supra note 256 at 64-66.
270
Id at 73-90.
271
Id at 85.
272
Jagsuch, supra note 256 at 89.
273
See LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 18-47; see also Marc Henry, The Contribution of Arbitral Case law and
National Laws in IAI SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NO.3. TOWARDS A UNIFORM
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique Schlaepfer, Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds.,
2005).
269
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on the member states,274 it stands to reason that the AARB will be a supranational body created
by an international convention. All countries that are signatories to the convention must treat the
awards rendered by the AARB as final. There will be uniform recognition and enforcement of
those awards in all the member states, with no interference from national courts.275
Even with an international convention, it is still possible that the argument of immunity
may be raised by states (when a state is a party to the proceeding or in some way can establish a
link to the arbitration) in order to avoid an unfavorable decision,276 as the Benvenuti & Bonfant v.
Congo277, SOABI (Seutin) v. Senegal278 and the Liberian Eastern Timber Corp. (LETCO) v.
Government of Republic of Liberia279 cases illustrate. It is also important that the states waive
immunity in relation to the enforcement and execution of awards rendered by the AARB.280
Hence arbitration agreements drafted by the AARB must include a clause to expressly waive any
claims to immunity.281 The ICSID suggests a model for waiver of immunity clause which
stipulates as follows:
“The [name of contracting state] hereby irrevocably waives any claim to
immunity in regard to any proceedings to enforce any arbitral award rendered by
a Tribunal constituted pursuant to this Agreement, including, without limitation,
immunity from service of process, immunity from jurisdiction of any court, and
immunity of any of its property from execution.”282
See for example, the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention.
See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9; see also Newman & Hill, supra note 62 at 416,
Holtzmann, supra note 6 at 112 and Schwebel, supra note 6 at 116 – 119.
276
See LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 8-46; see also RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.10. Susan Choi,
Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under The ICSID And New York Conventions, 28 NYUJILP 175, 181184 (1996), mentioning the cases quoted herewith.
277
Judgment of Dec. 23, 1980 (Benvenuti & Bonfant S.A.R.L. v. Government of the People's Republic of Congo),
Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 108 Journal du Droit International 365 (1981); 1982 Revue de l'Arbitrage 204, reprinted in 1
ICSID Reports 368 (R. Rayfuse ed., 1993).
278
État du Sénégal v. Seutin es qualité de liquidateur amiable de la SOABI, Judgment of Dec. 5, 1989, Cour d'appel,
117 Journal du Droit International 141 (1990); 1990 R. Arb. 164, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1341 (1990); 5 ICSID Rev.
Foreign Investment L.J. 135 (1990).
279
650 F. Supp. 73, 74-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd, 854 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1987).
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See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9.
281
See LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 8-46, see also RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.10.
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Choi, supra note 276 at 214.
274
275

53
The AARB should include a model clause which runs on the lines of the ICSID clause.
Including such a provision will undoubtedly ensure that the decisions of the AARB are truly
binding and easily enforceable in all the member countries.

D. Appointment of the Arbitrators

Number of Arbitrators
Generally, most arbitration tribunals are composed of a three-member panel or a single
arbitrator.283 If the parties to the arbitration do not agree on the number of arbitrators, the rules of
a number of institutions provide for the appointment of three arbitrators,284 while others provide
for a solo arbitrator.285 The main advantage of a three-member panel is that there may be
improved quality of the award with three arbitrators discussing the case.286 There is also lesser
possibility that the award rendered is erratic or erroneous.287 With a three-member panel, parties
will have the services of technical and legal experts to decide the issue. On the other hand, threemember panels tend to be more expensive than solo arbitrators.288 There is also the possibility
that the arbitrators may have conflicting schedules that makes it difficult for them to be present
simultaneously.289 There may also be problems within the tribunal if one of the arbitrators acts in
LEW ET AL supra note 1 at 10-10. The authors also mention that, generally, three member panels are preferred
in civil law countries while solo arbitrators are preferred in common law countries.
284
Id at 10-18 to 10-20 mentioning UNCITRAL Rules Article 5; China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration. Commission (CIETAC) Rules Article 24; German Institution of Arbitration (hereinafter DIS) Rules
section 3 (1); Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA) Rules Rule 5.
285
Id at 10-13 mentioning Article 8(2) of the ICC rules which states as follows: “Where the parties have not agreed
upon the number of arbitrators, the Court shall appoint a sole arbitrator, save where it appears to the Court that the
dispute is such as to warrant the appointment of three arbitrators”; id at 10-15 quoting Article 15 (3) of the English
Arbitration Act which provides that: “If there is no agreement as to the number of arbitrators, the tribunal shall
consist of a sole arbitrator”.
286
See BORN, supra note 211 at 68; LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-18.
287
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-19.
288
Id.
289
Id.
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a way that is detrimental to the interests of the arbitration.290 Given all these factors, it still
remains that the proposition of three-member panels to deal with the arbitration proceedings
seems a viable idea291, with the arbitration proceedings administered by the AARB.292

Method of Appointment of Arbitrators
Since party autonomy is of primary importance, the selection of the arbitrators is left to
the choice of the parties.293 The parties to the arbitration proceeding must be given equal
opportunity to each select an arbitrator of their choice294 and the third member of the panel, who
will act as the chairman of the panel will be chosen by mutual agreement of the parties or the
arbitrators.295 In instances where the arbitrators do not agree on the choice of the third
arbitrator/chairman by a stipulated time limit296, or specifically request (with the consent of the
parties) that the chairman be appointed, such appointment will then be instituted by the AARB.
Section 809 of the Italian Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
“Where the number of arbitrators is not indicated and where the parties do not
agree thereon, there shall be three arbitrators and, failing their appointment, the
president of the tribunal shall proceed therewith in the manner specified in Article
810, unless the parties have provided otherwise.”297
Article 38 of the ICSID Convention, Regulation and Rules provides that
“If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within 90 days after notice of
registration of the request has been dispatched by the Secretary-General in
accordance with paragraph 3 of Art.36, or such other period as the parties may
agree, the Chairman shall, at the request of either party, and after consulting both
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-19.
RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9.
292
See id.
293
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-45
294
Id at 10-81
295
Id at 10-90.
296
Id at 10-92 to 10-95mentioning the following: Article 8(4) of the ICC Rules, Article 7(3) of the UNCITRAL
Rules, CPR Arbitration Rules Rule 5 (2), DIS Rules Section 12 (2) Grain and Free trade Association ( hereinafter
GAFTA) Rule 3:2 (d).
297
Available at http://www.camera-arbitrale.com/show.jsp?page=169949.
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parties as far as possible, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet
appointed…”298
Similarly, the AARB will appoint arbitrators under the following circumstances: (1) if the parties
fail to reach an agreement on the appointment of the arbitrators by a reasonable time limit or (2)
either party to the proceeding fails to choose an arbitrator or (3) if the selection is left to the
discretion of the AARB. The reason behind this provision is that the arbitration should not be
discourage parties from engaging in delaying tactics299 and to bring a speedy resolution to the
dispute at hand.

E. Code of Ethics for the Arbitrators

The conduct of the arbitrators is of prime importance in conducting a fair and just
arbitration. Arbitration laws, ethical codes and the rules of various arbitration institutions and
conventions set forth the requirements regarding confidentiality300, disclosure301 and impartiality
and independence302 that arbitrators must adhere to. Henry Gabriel and Anjanette H. Raymond
present a synthesized format,303 drawn from the general rules of major arbitral institutions, the
specific ethical rules of arbitral institutions as well as the laws that govern arbitration. The tenpoint synthesis provides as follows:
298

Available at http://worldbank.int/icsid/basicdoc/partA-chap04.htm.
See LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-86.
300
LEW ET AL supra note 1 at 12-20: For example, LCIA Article 30(2), AAA International Center for Dispute
Resolution (ICDR) Rules Article 34, International Bar Association (IBA) Rules of Ethics Rule 9; see generally
TIBOR VÁRADY, JOHN J. BARCELÓ & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (2003) at 252-261.
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LEW ET AL supra note 1 at 11-30: Model Law Article 12, Sweden Arbitration Act Section 9, France NCPC
Article 1452, UNCITRAL Rules Article 9, ICC Rules Article 7 (2), DIS rules Section 16 and LCIA Article 5 (3).
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LEW ET AL supra note at 11-6 to 11-10 mentioning Article 5(2) of the LCIA Rules, Article 22 (a) of the WIPO
Rules, UNCITRAL Rules Article 9 and IBA Rules of Ethics Rules 1 and 3-1.
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Henry Gabriel & Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic Principles and Emerging
Standards, 5 WYLR 453 (2005).
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(1) Duty of Competency (2) Duty of Independence and Impartiality (3) Duty to Uphold the
Integrity and Fairness of the Proceeding (4) Duty of Disclosure (5) Duty to Communicate (6)
Duty to Act Professionally (7) Duty to Render a Decision (8) Duty to Act in a Fiduciary Manner
(9) Compensation and (10) Duty of Non-Neutral Arbitrator. This 10-point synthesis may serve as
a model in drafting the ethical code for the AARB.

F. Qualifications of the Arbitrators

Much has been said about the specialized knowledge and experience that is sought from
international arbitrators.304 An important criterion in the selection process of an arbitrator is the
professional background of the arbitrator; for instance, disputes from the textile industry would
require completely different experience and knowledge than disputes from the software
industry.305 For this reason, the AARB should maintain an exhaustive list of experts with
different technical backgrounds.306 Equally important is the selection of legal experts.307 Even
simple disputes in international commercial arbitration may lead to complex procedures or
conflict of laws; such problems will require to be handled by a lawyer or arbitrator with thorough
knowledge about international arbitration law and practice.308 Hence the AARB’s roster should
contain a combination of eminent technical and legal experts.
It is also important for the AARB to select arbitrators who possess relevant awareness of
different cultural and legal backgrounds because such awareness will be helpful in gaining the
Infra at Chapter III, page 17-18.
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-38; see VÁRADY ET AL supra note 300 at 278.
306
See Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 540; see also Newman & Hill supra note 62 and Fiske, supra note 246.
307
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-38 to 10-40.
308
Id; Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 540
304
305
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acceptance of parties from different backgrounds.309 Since it is generally advocated that
international arbitrators possesses command of the language of the arbitration proceedings rather
than require the services of a translators310, it would be additionally useful if AARB provided the
services of arbitrators from varied linguistic backgrounds or who possess command of different
languages. While contemplating the set up of the AARB, it has to kept in mind that there should
be a comparable number of arbitrators from different countries so as to provide as equal a
representation as possible.

G. Scope of Review

“[T]he more generous the scope for challenging decisions by appeal or review,
the greater the chance of eliminating error. But often at a heavy price.”311

One of the primary considerations in establishing an appellate body of arbitral review is
to provide for a speedy process of appeals. But a thorough review of merits312 should not to be
compromised for the ends of an expedited appeals system.313 The AARB is, therefore, faced with
the daunting task of balancing a thorough system of review with speed and expediency. It is also
important to take into consideration the needs and expectations of the parties. Existing rules of
arbitration provide a wide gamut of choices ranging from minimal standards of review314 to
broad “de novo” standards of review315.
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 10-41.
Id at 10-42.
311
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 563, quoting Lord Justice Dyson, Finality in Arbitration and Adjudication: The
Eversheds Lecture 2000, 66 ARBITRATION 288 (2000).
312
See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.9.
313
LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 21-88.
314
Knull &Rubins, supra note 4 at 560; New York Convention Rules, UNCITRAL Rules
315
See Grain And Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) Arbitration Rules, Rule 10; Coffee Trade Federation (CTF)
Arbitration Rules, Rule 40 mentioned by Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 557: “Generally speaking, commodities
appeal boards entertain appeals completely de novo, accepting all manner of new evidence and arguments.
309
310

58
It is advocated that the choice of a broad or narrow standard of review should a matter of
decision for the parties to the arbitration. The AARB can offer optional review processes that the
parties can choose from, based on their preferences and the needs of the dispute at hand.316

Provisions to Discourage Frivolous Appeals
In order to discourage frivolous or non-meritorious appeals, the AARB can use legal
ethics or sanctions, in a manner similar to national courts,317 against the appealing party or the
party’s counsel if the request for review is found to have no legitimate or reasonable basis.318
This procedure is called “Cost shifting” because in situations where an appellate panel affirms
the arbitration award, the party instituting a frivolous arbitral appeal would be responsible for his
opponent’s reasonable legal costs and other reasonable out-of-pocket expenses that have been
incurred as a result of the appeal.319
The rules of the CPR include two similar provisions.320 The first rule states that in cases
where the Appeal Tribunal affirms the original award, the appellant is obliged under Rule 12 to
reimburse the other party for attorneys’ fees and other out-of-pocket expenses related to the
appeal. The tribunal also has the discretion to allocate costs as it sees fit if the original award is
modified or set aside. The second rule provides that parties to the appeal procedure must
undertake under Rule 14 to reimburse opponents for costs associated with any unsuccessful

According to one English commentator, “nowadays, whatever the original arbitration award might say, an appeal
involves a new hearing, so that the Board is entitled to look at the matter afresh and not pay over much attention to
the original award.”
316
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 560.
317
Marisa Marinelli & Christelette Hoey, As Judicial Tolerance for Appeals Wanes, Litigants Are Risking Sanctions
When Seeking To Vacate Awards, 25 ALTHCL 51 (2007) and the cases mentioned therein; Sanctions For Frivolous
Appeal Against An Arbitral Award, 11 WAMREP 296 (2000); see B.L. Harbert International LLC v. Hercules Steel
Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006), SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1098-99 (5th Cir. 1993), Reis v. Morrison, 807
F.2d 112, 113 (7th Cir. 1986), Acevedo v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 538 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1976)
and Peirotti v. Torian, No. A086713, 2000 WL 696052 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., May 31, 2000).
318
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 561, see Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop? 61-JAN DRJ 16 (November, 2006-January, 2007) at 24-25.
319
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 562.
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subsequent court actions aimed at challenging the original or appellate award.321 The AARB may
model its provisions along the lines of the above-mentioned examples.

H. Accelerated Appeals Procedure

One of the chief advantages of arbitration as compared to litigation is its time
effectiveness.322 However, when parties subject an arbitral award to judicial review, it ultimately
becomes a time-consuming affair. Hence when the AARB is suggested as an alternative to
judicial review, it is important to include an expedited appeals procedure, which will “appeal” to
the parties.
The CPR maintains an appeals procedure with expedited briefing, which is considered to
be a “useful tool to minimize the time and cost involved in pursuing an appeal”. The CPR
procedure provide that the initiator of the appeal is to be allowed one opening brief and one
response, while the appellee can submit only one brief, unless he initiates a cross appeal, and that
oral arguments may be available at the request of either party. Additional evidence may be
submitted but the entire appeals process must be completed within six months after the
composition of the tribunal.323
Sammartano advocates a full hearing on merits and a more detailed appeals procedure for
an appellate body324, while Knull and Rubins suggest an expedited appeals procedure, along the
lines of some institutions such as the AAA325, WIPO326 or CAMCA327, to name a few, which
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 556 mentioning Rules 12 & 14 of the CPR Arbitration Appeal Procedure.
Id.
322
See generally infra Chapter III.
323
Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 559-560.
324
Infra Chapter VI at FN 291.
325
AAA Expedited Procedures, Art. E-1 to E-10.
326
WIPO Expedited Rules 1994.
320
321
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provide for “fast-track arbitration” procedures when the parties agree to shorten the time limits
that would otherwise apply for conducting the arbitration proceeding. They suggest that an
appeals mechanism may adopt such a similar fast track procedure to decide appeals without
compromising on accuracy and quality.328 A similar provision may be incorporated in the AARB
rules to accommodate the needs of parties who desire a quick resolution to their issue. On the
other hand, if parties so desire and time is not a constraint, a more elaborate appeal mechanism
may be drafted to accommodate specific needs. The AARB must indoctrinate a flexible
mechanism that is designed to accommodate varying requisites of parties.329

I. Reasonable Costs

One of the main reasons that parties enter into arbitral agreements is to avoid the cost of
litigating a controversy in a national court.330 Therefore, expensive, drawn-out litigation at the
award enforcement stage would counter any benefits conferred by the “initial choice of
arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution technique”.331 If, after a successful arbitration,
such parties still are faced with costly award enforcement litigation in a foreign court, the
327

Commercial Arbitration And Mediation Center Of The Americas (CAMCA) Arbitration Rules 1996.

Knull & Rubins, supra note 4 at 559:“The desirability of expediency and cost reduction in resolving any dispute
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track arbitration rules, published by such organizations as the AAA, WIPO, LCIA, and CAMCA. “Fast track”
mechanisms could include time limits on initial submissions and subsequent briefs, accelerated tribunal formation or
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329
See id at 560.
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benefits of arbitration would be destroyed.332 The Supreme Court decisions in Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Randolph333 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams334 and Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson335 illustrate the reluctance of courts to permit expanded judicial review quoting
the costs involved to parties as a major reason.336
It is imperative that the AARB incorporates an appeals system that is cost-effective,
among other things. The costs involved in bringing an appeal should be significantly lesser than
the comparative costs to bring the same dispute to judicial review, to make it beneficial for the
parties.

J. Precedent

The AARB may look to prior arbitral awards for guidance and choose to follow the
decisions set forth earlier. This raises the question of whether arbitral decisions have the value of
precedent. Often, the publication of arbitral decisions is limited, mostly for reasons of
Curtin, supra note 2 at 357-358.
531 U.S. 79 (2000).
334
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
335
513 U.S. 265, 270-72 (1995).
336
Sullivan, supra note 43 at 530:“In Green Tree Financial Corp., a party attempted to have an arbitration
agreement silent on the issue of costs invalidated due to the prohibitive expense of the arbitration. The Court
rejected the party's argument because the party failed to show why the arbitration was expensive and held that such
an invalidation of an agreement based on costs goes against the federal policy of encouraging arbitration. This
precedent is important in illustrating that the Court will look to economic factors in interpreting an arbitration
agreement. Therefore, it might not be outside the realm of reality for the Supreme Court to weigh the economic
detriment that parties would suffer in submitting awards to heightened judicial review with the advantages of
contractual freedom”, “The Circuit City case addressed whether employment contracts are beyond the grasp of the
FAA. After finding that the FAA applied to all employment contracts except those for transportation workers, the
Supreme Court stated: Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of
importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning
commercial contracts. These litigation costs to parties (and the accompanying burden to the Courts) would be
compounded by the difficult choice-of-law questions that are often presented in disputes arising from the
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the economic burden on parties and the docket burden on the courts if parties were allowed to expand judicial
review beyond what is set forth in the FAA”.
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confidentiality.337 Since arbitral decisions are not published, they are not considered to have the
value of legal precedent and hence, do not bind on arbitrators.338 Unlike a judge “who feels
bound by a previous decision, is under the obligation to defer to the precedent even though he
disagrees with the stated solution”339, an international arbitrator is not bound by prior decisions.
However, the importance of arbitral case law is not to be undermined. As stated in the
ICC Award No. 4131340: “The decisions of these tribunals progressively create case-law which
should be taken into account, because it draws conclusions from economic reality and conforms
to the needs of international commerce, to which rules specific to international arbitration,
themselves successively elaborated should respond”.341
The arbitrators of the AARB can be guided by the valuable decisions and reasonings of
the existing arbitral institutions from around the world without the rigors of being bound by
those decisions they do not agree with. In the absence of detailed published decisions, excerpts
of the legal rules applied by the tribunals and other relevant information may be taken into
consideration.342
There are several international arbitration institutions around the world. For purposes of
classification, we may divide arbitration institutions into the following categories:343
See Pierre Duprey, Do Arbitral Awards Constitute Precedents? Should Commercial Arbitration Be Distinguished
in this Regard from Arbitration Based on Investment Treaties? in IAI SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION NO.3. TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique
Schlaepfer, Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 2005).
338
Duprey, supra note 337at 266.
339
Id.
340
Isover St. Gobain v. Dow Chemical France et al.; ICC Case 4131/1982, I ICC AWARDS 146, 465, 1984 REV.
ARB. 137, IX YEARBOOK 131 (1984).
341
Duprey, supra note 337 at 259; see generally CRAIG ET AL., supra note 209 at § 35.02, see also Marc Henry,
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NO.3. TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? (Anne Veronique Schlaepfer,
Philippe Pinsolle & Louis Degos eds., 2005).
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Institutions Established by Private International Law
The ICC International Court of Arbitration, the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA), the Arbitration Institution of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce the American
Arbitration Association, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC), the
Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC), the

World Intellectual Property

Organization(WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Centre, the Cairo Regional Center for
International Commercial Arbitration, the China International Economic Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC),

the American Arbitration Association (AAA), The Stockholm

Chamber of Commerce (SCC), The Quebec Arbitration Centre, the Korean Commercial Board
and the Japan Commercial Arbitration association are some of the leading arbitration institutions
created by private law.344

Institutions Established by Public International Law
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the International Center for Settlement of
investment Disputes (ICSID), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission
(IACAC), Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of the Organization for the Harmonization
of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) are some institutions established by public international
law.345

Industry-specific /Commodity Institutions
Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA), Coffee Trade Federation (CTF), London
Rice Brokers' Association (LRBA), Refined Sugar Association (RSA), Federation of Oils. Seeds
344

LEW ET AL., supra note 1 at 3-26 to 3-34.
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and Fats Association (FOSFA), the Japan Shipping Exchange, the Hamburg Freundliche
Arbitrage and the Bremen Cotton Exchange in Germany (Baumwollborse) are some arbitration
institutions that are industry-specific.346

Special Purpose Institutions
The Iran – US Claims Tribunal, the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC),
the Claims Resolution for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland (CRT) and the International
Commission on Holocaust Rea Insurance Claims (ICHEIC) are some special-purpose tribunals
established to handle claims arising out of revolutions, war or other events that affect a large
number of people in the same way.347
The list of arbitration institutions provided here is not comprehensive.348 As is evident
from the list above, there are a plethora of arbitration institutions that have dealt with a vast
number of cases. There are also decisions of ad hoc arbitrations. The AARB may look to any or
all relevant arbitral decisions for guidance.
It is said that in order for arbitral case law to be implemented, it is imperative to have a
“distinctly organized structure that, by the specificity of its functioning, ensures coherence in the
establishment of arbitration case law”.349 The establishment of the AARB will provide precisely
such a structure for the appellate review of arbitral awards. To date, the decisions of arbitrators
are not part of any national order, so “the awards do not have a natural tendency to constitute
LEW ET AL., supra note1 at 3-36 to 3-38.
Id at 3-35 to 3-36.
347
Id at 3-39 to 3-58.
348
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349
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345
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established case law”350. The establishment of the AARB will, undoubtedly, contribute to the
establishment of arbitral case law.

K. Conclusion

The AARB will be modeled on the principles detailed above. While the above-mentioned
principles are illustrative, they are certainly not exhaustive. They may serve as starting points for
the consideration of the establishment of the AARB. As more scholars, arbitrators and others
contemplate the idea, more useful suggestions and ideas will undoubtedly arise which will pave
the way for the AARB to become a practical reality.

350

Duprey supra note 337 at 257, 258.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

“It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and
thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.”351

The idea of establishing a permanent body for arbitration has been advocated time and
again by scholars and experts.352 Several commentators have alluded to the benefits of a single
transnational source of appeal for arbitral awards.353 However, it is disheartening to note that no
significant progress has been made towards the achievement of this objective. Admittedly, there
are several practical hurdles in achieving such an objective354 and it is a task of no easy
magnitude, but the benefits outweigh the hardships.
As illustrated in the previous chapters, the establishment of the AARB will be a solution
to several problems rampant in international commercial arbitration and bring about a muchneeded uniform system of review of arbitral awards. The contemplated idea probably involves
several years of consolidated effort and international cooperation. This is all the more reason
why immediate efforts should be taken towards the achievement of this task.
RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 6 at 35.12, quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ comment in Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347,391(1912).
352
Infra Chapter I.
353
Id ; see Sarles, supra note 67 at 4 ; see also BÜHRING-UHLE, supra note 8 at 60; Mauro Rubino-Sammartano,
The Fall of a Taboo: Review of the Merits of an Award by an Appellate Arbitration Panel and a Proposal for an
International Appellate Court Journal of International Arbitration 20(4): 387–392, 2003.
354
See Martin Hunter, “The Impossible Dream” in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE (Martin Hunter, Arthur Marriott & V.V.Veeder eds.,
1995) at 157.
351
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While critics may view this as an “impossible and infeasible” proposition,355 it is wise to
bring to their attention the words of Judge Holtzmann:
“Let us pause for a minute to consider whether many of the developments in
international arbitration that seem ordinary today would have been thought to be
impossible dreams 100 years ago when the predecessor of the London Court of
International arbitration first opened its doors to serve the business community. If,
for example, someone had predicted in 1893 at a celebration of the inauguration
of the London Chamber of Arbitration that within the coming century 90 nations
would enter into a multilateral treaty binding themselves to procedures requiring
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards such as appear in the
New York Convention, would that not have been viewed as an impossible dream?
Yet, today, we recognise that the New York Convention is an indispensable
element in the structure of commercial arbitration.”356
The establishment of an AARB can well be achieved given significant international effort and
cooperation. The arrival of the AARB will signify the true “internationalization”357 of
international commercial arbitration.

See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO supra note 6 at 35.9.
Holtzmann, supra note 6 at 109-110.
357
THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY
CONFERENCE (Martin Hunter, Arthur Marriott & V.V.Veeder eds., 1995)
355
356
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